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ABSTRACT 
Our research focuses on comparing the performance of two open-source intrusion-
detection systems, Snort and Suricata, for detecting malicious activity on computer 
networks.  Snort, the de-facto industry standard open-source solution, is a mature product 
that has been available for over a decade.  Suricata, released two years ago, offers a new 
approach to signature-based intrusion detection and takes advantage of current 
technology such as process multi-threading to improve processing speed.  We ran each 
product on a multi-core computer and evaluated several hours of network traffic on the 
NPS backbone.  We evaluated the speed, memory requirements, and accuracy of the 
detection engines in a variety of experiments.  We conclude that Suricata will be able to 
handle larger volumes of traffic than Snort with similar accuracy, and thus recommend it 
for future needs at NPS since the Snort installation is approaching its bandwidth limits. 
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In spite of the many developments in network security over the past decade, the 
Internet remains a hostile environment for our networked computer systems.  According 
to the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report for 2010, “The volume and 
sophistication of malicious activity increased significantly in 2010” (Fossl, 2011).  
Attacks by worms such as Stuxnet and exploits in commonly used programs such as 
Adobe Acrobat are recent examples of the caliber and frequency of malicious activity 
that is seen being crafted with today’s technology.  It is no longer safe to ignore the 
security threats that we face, and we continue to become more and more dependent upon 
network connectivity and the Internet. 
The threats are not only to computers and hardware that we connect to the 
Internet, but to the data and information that resides within that infrastructure.  More and 
more we as a society are growing and developing our digital presence.  Beyond just our 
email, shopping habits, and bank account information, the data that is collected about us, 
that defines us, exists in this hostile network of systems; and without a commensurate 
increase in technologies to protect that data we risk compromise, theft, exploitation, and 
abuse of the data that defines our digital selves, be it our individual, personal identity or 
our corporate digital self, will cause real and significant damage in the real world. 
The Naval Postgraduate School is one such institution where information is 
processed on a large scale, stored, and transmitted over a diverse computer network.  
Information security is crucial to protect and sustain the development of critical research.  
Like many other government organizations the Naval Postgraduate School is constantly 
being probed and attacked in an attempt to penetrate the defenses and obtain the 
information within the NPS information domain.  To defend against that, NPS has built a 
robust defense architecture that monitors and guards the critical information against these 
intrusion attempts.  However this threat is not stagnant, and will continue to grow, 
change, and adapt to the current network security technologies. 
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Consequently, we must continue to advance the development of new security 
technologies to defend against the rising tide of malicious activity penetrating those 
networks.  Best practices in network security dictate that “defense-in-depth” (the strategy 
of establishing multiple layers of defense around critical infrastructure to protect the data) 
is an effective posture in defending against these attacks.  One critical aspect of network-
security monitoring is the incorporation of intrusion-detection and intrusion-prevention 
technologies within our defense-in-depth strategy (Kuipers & Fabro, 2006; Kumar & 
Panda, 2011).  An intrusion-detection system (IDS) monitors and logs the traffic that is 
traversing a network for signs of malicious or unwanted activity, and generates an alert 
upon discovery of a suspicious event. 
There are two types of intrusion-detection systems, host-based and network-
based.  A host based intrusion-detection system is a tool that resides on a network node, 
or a computer that is connected to the network.  Similar to a virus or malware scanner, it 
scans traffic destined for that particular host for signs of malicious activity, then 
generates alarms for those events.  At an enterprise scale, these host-based systems are 
widely deployed to send reports back to a centralized monitoring node where aggregation 
and study of the collective threat picture can occur.  A networked-based intrusion-
detection system is a device connected to the network in a manner similar to a network-
protocol analyzer, or “sniffer” as it is commonly called.  But it goes one step beyond 
simple packet capture and presentation to examine the contents of the packet data for 
signs of malicious activity.  A network-based intrusion-detection system monitors all of 
the network traffic and upon sensing an intrusion, sends an alarm to a monitoring console 
for further action.  Multiple network-based intrusion detection systems can be deployed 
throughout an enterprise at critical network junctures: the boundary link(s) to the Internet, 
the trunk to the VIP computer systems, the ingress and egress points for the server farm 
or data center, or the demarcation point of the enterprise wireless infrastructure. 
Intrusion detection as part of network-security monitoring involves reviewing and 
examining large amounts network traffic data. There are a number of ways to do 
network-security monitoring using intrusion-detection engines. One is to monitor 
network traffic in real time using a variety of tools that examine and interpret the traffic, 
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and output alerts as malicious traffic crosses the sensor on the network.  This real-time 
monitoring allows for an immediate response to any alarms generated by the intrusion 
detection engine.  The processing speed for real-time monitoring is bounded by the 
maximum speed of the network interface card.  Should the engine reside on a system with 
a low-capacity network interface card, the card may quickly become overloaded with 
network traffic and begin to drop packets.  The more packets that are dropped, the greater 
the chances of a malicious payload getting through the intrusion-detection layer of 
defense.  Therefore, the system running the detection engine should be capable of 
processing traffic at a speed equal or greater to the maximum capacity of the network. 
Another method is to use the intrusion-detection system engine for playback or 
non-real-time analysis of archived traffic.  This approach is more often applied to post-
incident network forensic analysis.  Where real-time monitoring of network traffic is 
bounded by the speed of the network interface card, forensic analysis of archived network 
traffic is limited by the computing hardware and the detection engine software.  It is 
during forensic analysis that we will see the greatest performance increase by increasing 
the computer’s processing ability in CPU, memory, and disk I/O speeds 
There are presently two main categories of intrusion-detection, anomaly-based 
and signature-based.  Anomaly-based detection examines the network traffic from a 
holistic perspective, looking for traffic that falls outside of what is considered normal 
activity.  Any such events are analyzed and if necessary, further investigation and 
subsequent action is taken to mitigate the anomaly (García-Teodoro, Díaz-Verdejo, 
Maciá-Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009).  Anomaly detection is good for discovering new, 
previously unknown attacks in a relatively small network environment.  Signature-based 
intrusion-detection attempts to match network traffic data to a preloaded signature 
database.  Typically, these signature rules are generated from previously discovered 
malicious traffic, but they can be custom crafted to match any sort of traffic flowing 
through the network.  Upon matching a signature rule the detection engine generates an 
alert which is subsequently sent to the analyst for further action. 
An example of a signature-based detection would be when the intrusion-detection 
system generates an alert from an attempt by an attacker to create a reverse command 
 4
shell to an internal server.  In this case, the attacker is attempting to gain unauthorized 
access to a protected system within the network perimeter by attempting to pass to the 
server a series of commands which would initiate a reverse connection to the attacker’s 
computer.  This type of attack could be detected by a signature-based system through the 
commands that the attacker issues.  One common command that a system scans for is 
“c:/windows/cmd.exe.”  An anomaly-based system would instead notice a command shell 
request being generated from outside of the protected server enclave.  Since this is not 
considered normal activity for the traffic that flows to and from the Internet, this would 
then be flagged as an alert.  Other examples of behavior that would trigger an anomaly-
based alert might include after-hours access by a user who normally works during the 
day, indicating possible unauthorized access; significant change in data traffic from one 
area of the network to another, indicating possible data exfiltration; or an increase in data 
communications between a growing number of workstations, indicating a possible worm 
infestation. 
In recent years, with the increase in complexity and frequency of Internet attacks, 
intrusion detection has become significantly more important to a wider audience.  
Numerous companies and organizations have been working to develop the technology 
and have produced several products, both open source and proprietary.  One of the most 
popular and widespread open-source signature-based network intrusion-detection engines 
is Snort, maintained by SourcFire (www.sourcefire.com).  Originally developed to 
monitor the application layer of network data packets, Snort was developed in 1998 by 
Martin Roesch and is based on the Libpcap library (Roesch, 2005).  The current modular 
design of Snort in today’s version was settled on in 1999 with Snort 1.5.  This modular 
design allows developers to build and add-on additional features without the need to 
rewrite the core detection engine.  Snort has become the de-facto industry standard for 
signature-based network intrusion-detection engines.  An overview of the specific 
capabilities of the Snort intrusion-detection system is in (Tenhunen, 2008). 
Almost a decade later, in 2009, the Open Information Security Foundation (OISF) 
released a new signature-based network intrusion-detection engine called Suricata.  
Suricata is also an open-source signature-based network intrusion-detection engine 
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envisioned to be the next generation intrusion-detection/prevention system engine 
(Jonkman, 2009).  Significant funding for the project comes from the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T) Homeland 
Open Security Technology (HOST) program and the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare 
Command (SPAWAR).  As the OISF title implies, the development framework for 
Suricata is open-source and is licensed by the GNU Public License v2 (OISF, 2011a). 
One advance that Suricata incorporates is a new Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
normalizer.  Called the HTP library and developed independently for the Suricata project 
by Ivan Ristic, it is an advanced HTTP parser developed for Suricata and the OISF that is 
designed to be “security-aware,” meaning that it is capable of examining HTTP traffic for 
the attack strategies and evasion techniques used by attackers to circumvent an intrusion-
detection system (Ristic, 2009). 
Another advance in the Suricata engine is the ability to employ native multi-
threaded operations, something more necessary as network bandwidth increases (Nielsen, 
2010).  The typical Snort installation can process network traffic at a rate of 100-200 
megabits per second before reaching the processing limit of a single CPU and dropping 
packets to compensate (Lococo, 2011).  That is because the current Snort engine is a 
single-threaded multi-stage design (Roesch, 2010) and does not perform as well as 
Suricata in a multi-threaded environment (Day & Burns, 2011). For Snort to take 
advantage of the multiple processors, one would have to start a new instance of Snort for 
each desired CPU, which could be a management challenge.  Suricata is designed from 
the outset to take advantage of operating with multiple CPUs (OISF, 2011a). This 
required development of original detection algorithms from the ground up.  Nonetheless, 
the developers intend to support the same rule language used in the Snort rules; and when 
the Suricata engine is more stable the OISF will make available Suricata’s extended 
features (OISF, 2011a). 
In Chapter II, we will review the challenges of intrusion-detection and look at 
how Suricata and Snort attempt to address these challenges.  We will examine other 
works in the field of network security that compare the differences between Suricata and 
Snort. 
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In Chapter III, we will introduce and describe our testing methodology for our 
comparison of Suricata and Snort.  We will discuss the setup of our experiments and the 
steps involved in building the testbed.  We will also introduce the supporting applications 
required to complete our experiments. 
In Chapters IV and V, we will present our results and conclusions respectively.  
We will then discuss further research that can be done to compare the two engines, and 
provide a recommendation for implementation of the Suricata intrusion-detection system. 
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II. PREVIOUS WORK 
Intrusion detection is difficult to accomplish perfectly.  With the volume of 
network traffic rapidly increasing and the number and complexity of network attacks 
increasing just as quickly, it becomes increasingly difficult for a signature-based 
intrusion-detection system to keep up with the current threats (Weber, 2001).  When a 
system fails to generate an alarm, the result could be the compromise of critical data 
within the network infrastructure.  Worse, if the system generates too many false alarms, 
the operators monitoring the system may become desensitized to the alerts and may 
ignore a genuine alert in the future. 
Four possible situations occur with alerts generated by an intrusion-detection 
system: true-positive, true-negative, false-positive, and false-negative.  The true positive 
is when the detection engine generates an alert based on the correct identification of a 
potential threat.  The true negative is when a detection engine does not generate an alert 
for normal traffic: this occurs during a benign network traffic flow.  The false positive is 
when a detection engine generates an alert for an event that is not malicious.  The most 
dangerous of conditions is the false negative when a detection engine does not alert on 
malicious traffic, thereby allowing it to enter the network without notice.  Accuracy in 
intrusion detection can be measured by the number of false positives and false negatives 
generated by the detection engine. 
There are a number of ways that false positive and false negative conditions can 
occur.  Faulty rule design, including invalid signature information or improper rule 
language, is one way, but this is rare.  Similarly, rules may be imprecise because there is 
no distinctive signature for a particular kind of attack.  These types of error would result 
in a false positive or false negative across all intrusion-detection engines using the same 
rules.  False positives and false negatives can also occur through performance problems 
with the detection engine itself.  To analyze a network traffic flow for signs of intrusion, 
the detection engine must examine every packet that traverses the network wire.  If the 
hardware fails or becomes otherwise overused, it can drop one or more packets, allowing 
a malicious packet to enter the network.  Unlike a dropped packet in a router, in an 
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intrusion-detection system a dropped packet is not discarded at the detection engine, but 
rather when an intrusion-detection engine drops a packet it passes through to the 
protected network.  This overload condition could be intentionally caused by an attacker 
for the purpose of injecting malicious traffic.  It is therefore important to measure the 
performance capability of an intrusion-detection system to ensure that the system can 
support the capacity of the network on which it is deployed. 
One means to improve performance is to split the data stream between multiple 
processing engines.  However, any malicious bits that may be residing in a traffic flow 
may get split too, resulting in neither engine matching the complete signature.  To 
mitigate this situation, either the detection engines must pass coordination information 
between each other, further increasing the computational load on the system, or the 
network traffic must be divided by a “flow-aware” network tap that can keep related data 
together. 
This research examines the Suricata intrusion-detection system (Shimel, 2010).  
By containing the multiple threads within the same detection engine, a multi-threaded 
detection engine can make intelligent decisions on how to split processing and can 
coordinate signature detection between these threads all within the same detection engine.  
Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965) predicts that computational speed doubles every eighteen 
months for single threaded processing architectures.  Multi-threaded processing can take 
advantage of that prediction.  According to Nielsen’s Law of Internet Bandwidth, we will 
also see 50% increases in network bandwidth every year (Nielsen, 2010).  The 
performance of our intrusion-detection system systems should increase as our demand for 
network bandwidth also increases.  The developers of Suricata have chosen to address 
that demand through multi-threaded processing (OISF, 2011a). 
Considering that the most computationally intensive work performed by an 
intrusion-detection engine is detection, the Suricata developers decided to use threads for 
detection.  Figure 1 gives an example with the creation of three detect threads.  Suricata 
can receive network traffic from the network interface card or from previously recorded 
network traffic from a file stored in PCAP format.  Traffic is passed through the decode 
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module where it is first decoded as per its protocol, then the streams are reassembled 
prior to being distributed between the signature-detection modules. 
 
Figure 1.   Suricata multi-thread design (From OISF, 2011c) 
The Suricata configuration file allows the user to configure which and how many 
threads, and how many CPUs will be involved in the processing of each stream.  Figure 2 
illustrates how Suricata can distribute the various modules in the processing stream 
across the different CPU cores in the computer. 
 
Figure 2.   Suricata multi-CPU affinity (From OISF, 2011c) 
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Previous work compared the performance of Snort version 2.8.5.2 to Suricata 
version 1.0.2 (Day & Burns, 2011).  Their testbed consisted of an Ubuntu 10.04 virtual 
machine hosted in a VMWare Workstation 6.5 virtual environment running on a 2.8GHz 
Quad-Core Intel Xeon CPU with 3GB of RAM.  The study examined detection engine 
speed as well as the accuracy under varying degrees of network and processor use.  CPU 
use was controlled using Cpulimit (cpulimit.sourceforge.net), network bandwidth was 
controlled using Tcpreplay (tcpreplay.synfin.net), and alert generation was stimulated by 
injecting six known malicious exploits generated using the Metasploit framework 
(www.metasploit.com).  The results show that Snort is more efficient with system 
resources than Suricata, and when operating in a multi-CPU environment, Suricata is 
more accurate due to fewer false negative alerts.  However they concluded that the 
overall performance of Suricata in a four-core environment was slower than that of Snort 
in a single-core environment when processing 2 gigabytes of previously captured 
network data. 
In April 2011, Damaye (2011b) published an online report comparing the 
accuracy of Snort and Suricata in detecting a wide variety of malicious files and 
suspicious actions.  His tests incorporated the latest versions of Suricata and Snort with 
signature rules from both the Snort Vulnerability Research Team (VRT) and Emerging 
Threats (ET).  Creating a custom application in Python specifically designed to send a 
variety of specific vulnerabilities through an intrusion-detection system via a number of 
different vectors, he attempted to measure the accuracy of both detection engines.  
During his tests he measured the number of true and false positives and negatives and 
assigned a score to Snort and Suricata for each of the tests conducted.  The results of his 
study concluded that the two rule sets (VRT and ET) worked well together but required 
tuning to be most effective.  He further concluded that while Suricata is a promising new 
technology with key features, Snort still is preferable for production environments. 
Leblond (2001) ran a series of tests to examine the performance of the multi-
threading capabilities of Suricata.  By adjusting the detect_thread_ratio and the 
cpu_affinity variables in the Suricata configuration file on a dual 6-core CPU system with 
hyper-threading enabled, he was able to achieve the best performance by reducing the 
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thread ratio to .125, which corresponded to three threads generated by Suricata in his test 
environment.  He also determined that the hyper-threading configuration caused 
variations in the performance results (30% variation between runs) and that it was 
actually best to configure the multiple threads to run on the same hardware CPU.  
Following his initial research, in February 2011 Leblond dove deeper into the workings 
of the Suricata multi-threading design.  Using a tool called Perf-tool 
(code.google.com/p/google-perftools) he was able to determine that, as the number of 
threads increased, more time was spent waiting for an available lock.  His conclusion was 
that configuring Suricata to run in RunModeFilePcapAutoFp results in a steady 
performance increase, whereas RunModeFilePcapAuto shows an initial increase, then a 
continued decrease in performance as measured by packets per second processed. 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS 
Our experiments tested and compared the Suricata and Snort intrusion-detection 
engines in performance and accuracy in a busy virtual environment.  The experiments 
evaluated performance by measuring the percentage of CPU use, memory use, and 
network use.  We measured accuracy by subjecting both detection engines to malicious 
traffic in controlled tests, and comparing the alerts generated by each application. 
Traffic data for our experiments originated from a network tap located on the 
backbone of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Education Resource Network (ERN).  
At the point of the network tap the NPS ERN has a bandwidth of 20 Gbps, providing a 
large “pipe” to send traffic to our intrusion-detection system.  Traffic across the NPS 
backbone averages 200Mbps per day.  We used this traffic to compare the performance 
and alerts of the virtual machine while running Snort and Suricata. 
Signatures for the experiments came from the two primary open-source intrusion-
detection system rule maintainers, the SourceFire Vulnerability Research Team (VRT) 
and Emerging Threats (ET).  The SourceFire VRT “develops and maintains the official 
rule set” for Snort (SourceFire, 2011).  Emerging Threats originally began as a 
community-authored list of rules to augment the SourceFire VRT body of rules. Initially 
considered less robust than the VRT rules, the ET rules now provide new capabilities.  
Where the VRT rule set is specifically designed to support Snort exclusively, the ET rule 
set is “platform agnostic” by design and will work on any type of open-source intrusion-
detection system application (Emerging Threats, 2011).  Both Suricata and Snort support 
the rules from VRT and ET. 
Our research questions are: 
1. Does Suricata with its multi-threaded processing perform better than Snort with 
its single-threaded processing? 
2. As CPU and memory use increase, are there differences in the number of  
dropped packets between the two engines? 
3. Will Suricata handle heavy loads better than Snort? 
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4. Is Suricata suitable to be implemented within the NPS production network?  At 
the time of the experiment, the NPS Information Technology Department was unsure 
whether to use Suricata and was hoping our experiments would help them to decide. 
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
Most experiments were conducted in a virtual machine running VMware ESXi 
4.1.  The server hardware was a Dell Poweredge R710 dual quad-core server with 96 GB 
of RAM.  Each CPU was an Intel Xenon E5630 running at 2.4 Ghz.  The data storage 
was accomplished through three fiber-channel attached RAID 5 configured arrays, 
supporting the relatively large network traffic capture files (PCAP files) needed to test 
the detection engines.  The server had eight 1Gbps network cards installed, with four 
reserved for the various management activities and four available for the Virtual 
Machine.  For our experiments the server was configured with two interface cards, one 
for system administration and one to capture network traffic.  The interface card attached 
to the network tap was configured in promiscuous mode to allow it to receive all of the 
network traffic.  Our virtual machine used 4 CPU cores and 16GB of RAM.  The 
operating system chosen for the experiment was CentOS 5.6 due to its popularity for 
enterprise applications and close relationship to Red Hat Enterprise Linux. 
Installation of Suricata was relatively straightforward.  Precompiled versions of 
Suricata were difficult to find due in part to the relative newness of Suricata compared to 
Snort.  So we compiled it.  To do this we had to install a number of software 
dependencies which were not included in the CentOS 5.6 distribution.  Among these 
were the Perl compatible regular expression (PCRE) libraries, packet-capture libraries 
(Libpcap) to allow the operating system to capture all of the traffic on the network, and 
YAML Libraries (libyaml) required to interpret Suricata’s YAML-based configuration 
files (Ben-Kiki, Evans, & dot Net, 2010). 
Initially, we started with version 1.0.3 of Suricata, but during the experiment the 
Suricata developers released a major version change to 1.1 beta2.  This version fixed 
several key performance and rule issues that were present in the earlier versions (OISF, 
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2011a).  After the initial installation the upgrade process was simple, involving only a 
download of the 1.1beta2 source code and compiling it on the system. 
Installation of Snort 2.9.0.5 on CentOS Linux distributions has a number of 
known issues, namely compatibility with the version of Libpcap that is distributed with 
CentOS prior to 5.6.  Fortunately, Vincent Cojot maintains a series of RPMs 
(precompiled software for installation on Red Hat-based Linux distributions) for Snort on 
CentOS (vscojot.free.fr/dist/snort).  Installation of Snort simply involved downloading 
the latest Snort RPM and extracting the program.  The required PCAP library was already 
installed during the Suricata install so there were no other dependencies involved.  
During the experiments the need to upgrade Snort 2.9.1 beta also became apparent due to 
the large size of our PCAP files.  Unfortunately Vincent Cojot’s RPM repository did not 
contain the latest 2.9.1 beta version of Snort at the time, so we were unable to upgrade to 
2.9.1 and conduct some of our planned tests. 
Care must be taken to ensure that the proper version of rules is downloaded for 
the corresponding intrusion-detection engine, or a significant number of errors will be 
reported during startup in Suricata, and in the case of Snort the startup process will abort 
altogether.  The VRT web site does not maintain a separate set of rules optimized for 
Suricata, so upon loading the VRT rules in Suricata we received a number of rule errors. 
We also used Pytbull, a utility written in Python and designed by Sebastian 
Damay to test and evaluate an intrusion-detection system’s ability to detect malicious 
traffic (Damaye, 2011a) by sending it sample traffic.  Installation of Pytbull was fairly 
simple considering that several of the dependencies for Pytbull were already installed for 
Suricata and Snort.  Pytbull requires Python and Scapy (www.secdev.org/projects/scapy), 
and the environment must have an FTP server and a web server available. 
To capture live traffic from the network and replay that data for static file 
analysis, the Tcpdump (tcpdump.org) and Tcpreplay (tcpreplay.synfin.net) utilities were 
also required.  Collection of the system performance data while running each of the 
experiments was accomplished using the tool Collectl (Collectl.sourceforge.net). 
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B. EXPERIMENTS 
The first experiment examined the real-time performance of each system 
independently while monitoring live backbone traffic from the NPS ERN.  Performance 
data from the CPU, RAM, and network interface was recorded, examined, and compared.  
A variation of the first experiment ran both detection engines simultaneously. 
The second experiment ran Suricata on the NPS Hamming supercomputer.  The 
NPS High Performance Computing Center operates a Sun Microsystems 6048 “blade” 
system with 144 blades and 1152 CPU cores (Haferman, 2011) running CentOS 5.4 as 
the operating system.  For our experiment we used one compute node composed of 48 
AMD Opteron 6174 12-core processors with 125GB of RAM available.  We measured 
the increased performance when running Suricata on this high-performance computer.  
The goal was to determine if it was feasible for an intrusion analyst to process stored 
network traffic significantly more quickly in such an environment. This task is important 
for our Information Technology Department as they are regularly called upon to do 
retrospective analysis of data of particular attacks. 
The third experiment measured how well each intrusion-detection system detected 
a variety of malicious packets sent to it.  This experiment was not concerned as much 
with the computational performance as with the accuracy of detection. 
Experiment One Setup 
The first experiment compared Suricata to Snort when monitoring network traffic 
at the NPS border router.  The NPS backbone connects to the Internet with a maximum 
bandwidth of 20Gbps.  Figure 3 shows the logical network diagram for Experiment One. 
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Figure 3.   Experiment One setup 
We first installed and ran each detection engine individually in the virtual 
machine environment with the combined ET and VRT rule sets.  Collectl was used to 
record the CPU, RAM, and network use of the server.  The experiments were conducted 
over approximately a 4 hour period of normal network use on the NPS backbone.  
Performance configuration settings for each detection engine were set to the default 
parameters. 
We then ran instances of both Snort and Suricata on the virtual machine at the 
same time.  This allowed us to compare the accuracy of each detection engine in 
generating alerts from the same live network traffic.  System CPU, RAM and network 
use were also recorded for this experiment, but are not a reliable indicator of the true 
intrusion-detection system load since it is unusual to run two engines on the same system 
at the same time.  We then evaluated the alert logs from each detection engine looking for 
differences. 
Experiment Two Setup 
For Experiment Two, we put Suricata on the Hamming supercomputer to measure 
the speed of processing there.  We used Tcpdump to capture a large PCAP file from the 
NPS ERN backbone.  The file was roughly 6GB and consisted of full packet data 
(obtained by tcpdump -nnvi eth0 -s0), the same type of data stored in a typical 
network archive.  To reduce the impact of disk input/output latency we copied the PCAP 
file to a RAM disk on the Hamming computer.  We ran Suricata with this large PCAP file 
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on both our Experiment One setup and on the Hamming supercomputer, and compared 
the time it took to analyze the file using the full rule set with various configuration 
settings. 
Experiment Three Setup 
The third experiment tested how accurately Suricata and Snort recognized 
malicious or irregular traffic.  Using Pytbull we generated a number of tests containing 
suspicious or malicious payloads, and sent them through the intrusion-detection systems 
to stimulate alerts.  These tests were divided into nine categories: client-side attacks, 
common rule testing, malformed traffic, packet fragmentation, failed authentication, 
intrusion-detection system evasion, shell code, denial of service, and malware 
identification.  Each category contains a number of different tests for evaluating our 
detection engines. 
Setup for this experiment required two additional machines: one to generate the 
test traffic (Client), and one to host an HTTP server with malicious PDF files (Hostile 
Internet web server) as illustrated in figure 4.  We used a VMWare Workstation7 virtual 
machine running Ubuntu 10.04 for the client machine, and for the web server with the 
PDF files we used a Dell Latitude laptop running Xubuntu. This test required an FTP 
service and a web server be installed and running on the intrusion-detection system 
server.  We chose to install Vsftpd for our FTP client due to its small size and ease in 
configuration.  Fortunately CentOS 5.6 already had a web server included in the base 
distribution.  To log the computational performance data we ran Collectl. 
 
Figure 4.   Experiment Three logical network diagram 
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For the experiment, our web server was preloaded with a variety of corrupt files.  
These files consisted of segments of observed malware from security-related sites on the 
Internet that collect these files for research purposes.  Each tainted file was hashed prior 
to distribution to ensure the integrity of the file.  For our experiment we selected some 
typical file types seen on the Internet, specifically four PDF and one XLS file. 
Running the experiment consisted of starting Collectl on our system testbed 
computer to log the performance data, then starting the Pytbull client-side remote shell 
script there.  Next we started the Httpd service on both the hostile web server and the 
intrusion-detection server.  In addition, we start the Vsftpd service on the intrusion-
detection server.  After confirming that these services were running, we started our 
detection engine, either Snort or Suricata.  Once the detection engine was loaded and 
listening to the network interface, we ran Pytbull from out testing client, pointing it at the 
address of our intrusion-detection system.  The application completed the battery of tests, 
exited, and generated an HTML report listing the exploits that were attempted and the 
alert response from the intrusion-detection system if any.  Then we stopped the HTTP 
services and the intrusion-detection services. 
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Our experiments occurred over several days.  As the experiments progressed we 
ran into a few issues while tuning Suricata in the virtual environment.  We encountered 
an apparent upper limit in the amount of RAM that applications can use in a 32-bit 
operating system.  As a result we were unable to load the entire combined ET and VRT 
rule set (more than 30,000 rules) in our 32-bit CentOS 5.6 operating system.  The 
limitation is due to a 4GB memory limit for running both applications and the kernel in 
32-bit Linux operating systems.  (Suricata if compiled on a 64-bit operating system could 
take advantage of up to 48GB of RAM and could accommodate over 30,000 rules.)  As a 
result, for our experiments we had to reduce the number of rules to a combination of ET 
and VRT rules totaling 16,996 signatures.  The list of rule files used in our experiments 
can be found in Appendix B Annex 1. 
We also ran into a problem with keeping up with network traffic, which limited 
our ability to effectively measure the accuracy of both the Snort and Suricata detection 
engines.  While in promiscuous mode, the kernel was unable to buffer the entire network 
stream as it was passed from the network interface card.  Using Tcpdump, we first saw 
dropped packets at rates of up to 50%, and both Suricata and Snort indicated high 
numbers of dropped packets in their log files.  Considering the commonality of the high 
rate of packet drops, we concluded that the cause was in the virtual networking 
environment of the ESXi server.  Attempting to mitigate this problem, we adjusted 
several kernel settings on the server to increase the memory allocated to the networking 
buffer.  The default buffer settings appear to be insufficiently large to accommodate the 
volume of traffic on the NPS network backbone.  The following commands were used to 
increase the kernel buffer sizes. 
sysctl -w net.core.netdev_max_backlog=10000 
sysctl -w net.core.rmem_default=16777216 
sysctl -w net.core.rmem_max=33554432 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_mem=’194688 259584 389376’ 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_rmem=’1048576 4194304 33554432’ 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_no_metrics_save=1 
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With these modified kernel parameters, we reduced the packets dropped by 
Tcpdump to less than 1% (70121 packets dropped out of 7822944 packets).  While this 
did not eliminate all packet loss, it reduced it to an acceptable rate for continued testing. 
A. EXPERIMENT ONE 
The data collected from Experiment One showed that Suricata consumed more 
computational resources than Snort while monitoring the same amount of network traffic.  
Figures 5 and 6 graph the virtual server CPU use of both Snort and Suricata while 
monitoring the backbone interface.  CPU use for Snort is 60–70 % for one CPU while 
Suricata maintains an average in the 50–60% range across all four CPUs...but Suricata 










Suricata CPU Utilization 08/08 
(Cumulative)
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3
 











Snort CPU Utilization 08/08
(Cumulative)
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3
 
Figure 6.   Snort CPU Use 
Our data showed that Suricata was more memory-intensive than Snort.  As 
illustrated in Figure 7, system memory use increased starting at approximately 1.5 Gbytes 
and increased to just over 3 Gbytes before tapering off near 3.3 Gbytes.  Snort’s memory 
usage was relatively low, starting at only 0.8 Gbytes and remaining below 1.0 Gbytes for 

































Figure 8.   Snort RAM Use 
Network performance remained an issue for our tests with Snort.  While we were 
able to reduce the packet drop rate in Tcpdump to less than 1%, the output log from Snort 
reported a packet drop rate of 53%.  Suricata, on the other hand, had a drop rate of 7%.  
The Snort log file further classifies the dropped packets as “outstanding packets,” 
meaning packets that are dropped before being received by the packet processing engine 
in Snort (Watchinski, 2010).  Our data showed that the number of outstanding packets in 
Snort matched the number of dropped packets in Snort, indicating that the loss of packets 
occurred prior to packet capture, and is therefore not a function of the processing load of 
the detection engine itself.  Suricata does not break down the composition of dropped 
packets in the same manner as Snort, so the same deduction cannot be assumed solely by 
the log files.  Further investigation and research should be conducted to determine why 
there is a disparity between the rate of dropped packets in Tcpdump, Suricata, and Snort. 
Network performance during the first experiment was not comparable since the 
detection engines were not monitoring the same network traffic at the same time.  The 
average packet rate during the Suricata period was 33,731 packets per second, and during 
the Snort period was 20,090 packets per second.  Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the observed 
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Figure 10.   Snort Packet Rate 
Experiment One also measured the alerts generated by Suricata and Snort running 
simultaneously on the same system.  Figure 11 and Appendix A, Annex 1, compare the 
alerts generated by the two detection engines. 
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Figure 11.   Suricata and Snort Combined Alert Frequency
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The data show that for most rules Suricata generated more alerts than Snort on the 
same network traffic.  Though both engines loaded the same rule sets, we did get error 
messages and some rules may have failed to load successfully on one engine.  Other 
reasons could be a bug in the implementation of the rule on an engine, or a problem in the 
algorithm used to analyze the traffic.  Further study at the packet level would be 
necessary to determine exactly what happened in each case. 
B. EXPERIMENT TWO 
Experiment Two ran Suricata on the Hamming supercomputer.  We tested a 
number of configuration settings for the number of processing threads and the run mode.  
Installation of Snort and Suricata on Hamming was straightforward, with the only 
difference from Experiment One being the relocation of the libraries and binaries to a 
user-accessible directory.  For these experiments, we used a 6GB Libpcap file previously 
generated from NPS backbone traffic.  We did not study the accuracy of the alerts for this 
experiment, only the relative difference in processing performance. 
We adjusted three parameters in the Suricata configuration file to tune the 
performance: detect_thread_ratio, max-pending-packets, and run mode (OISF, 2010). 
• The detect_thread_ratio value determines the number of threads that 
Suricata will generate within the detection engine.  Detect_thread_ratio is 
multiplied by the number of CPUs available to determine the number of 
threads.  The default detect_thread_ratio in Suricata is 1.5.  In our 
experiments we used values from .1 through 2.0. 
• The max-pending-packets value determines the maximum number of 
packets the detection engine will process simultaneously.  There is a 
tradeoff between caching and CPU performance as this number is 
increased.  While increasing this number will more fully use multiple 
CPUs it will also increase the amount of caching required within the 
detection engine.  The default for max-pending-packets is 50.  In our 
experiments we increased this value by an order of 10 for each iteration up 
to 50,000. 
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• The runmode value determines how Suricata will handle the processing of 
each thread.  There are three options: single, auto, and autofp.  Single 
instructs Suricata to operate in single-threaded mode.  In auto mode 
Suricata takes packets from a single flow and distributes them among the 
various detect threads.  In autofp mode all packets from a single flow are 
assigned to a single detect thread. 
Results from our experiment showed that with 48 CPUs the difference between 
the performance in the auto and autofp runmode increased as we increased the max-
pending-packets variable across all detect_thread_ratio settings.  We found that the 
detect_thread_ratio setting had minimal impact on performance in either the auto or 
autofp runmode regardless of the max-pending-packets setting.  Figure 12 illustrates the 
performance difference between the auto and autofp runmode averaged across all of the 





























Figure 12.   Suricata runmode performance for 48 CPUs 
On our 4-CPU virtual machine testbed running Suricata we did not see the same 
performance increase observed on the 48 CPU Hamming computer when adjusting the 
max-pending-packets. As Figure 13 illustrates, our observations showed that running in 
AutoFP runmode on a 4 CPU machine incurs a performance penalty over the Auto 
runmode.  Performance for both AutoFP and Auto runmodes averaged around 19,000 




























Figure 13.   Suricata runmode performance for 4 CPUs 
Our 6GB Libpcap file consisted of nearly 8 million packets with an average size 
of 803.6 bytes each.  Based on these average statistics, the minimum packets per second 
processed by Suricata in Figure 13 equates to 108 Mbps, and the maximum packets per 
second on the Figure corresponds to 854 Mbps. 
Unlike operations on the 48-CPU Hamming, we did observe an improvement in 
performance of the Auto runmode as we increased the detect_thread_ratio resulting in an 
increase in the number of threads.  In Figure 14 we see that the noticeable drop in 
performance at 8 threads while in the AutoFP runmode is the result of limited system 
memory causing the operating system to begin using the hard drive swap space to 
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Figure 14.   Suricata detect thread ratio performance 4-CPU 
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C. EXPERIMENT THREE 
Experiment Three evaluated the accuracy of Snort and Suricata when exposed to 
known malicious packets.  For 54 tests in 9 categories conducted against both Suricata 
and Snort, Suricata had 12 and Snort 16 false negatives where they did not detect the 
malicious traffic.  Where false negatives were observed in both Suricata and Snort, the 
most likely reason was that the rule used by both was not loaded or optimized for the 
particular threat.  In only two cases did Snort and Suricata report different results:  One 
was a client-side attack where Suricata detected all 5 tests and Snort only 3, and the other 
was in the evasion-technique attack where Snort identified that an evasion attempt was 
underway; while Suricata did not. 
False positives were more difficult to measure considering the composite nature 
of the Pytbull tests.  For example, Test 8 under the category Test Rules is a full SYN 
scan.  A true positive result would be an alert that a full SYN scan was underway.  
However a full SYN scan will itself generate a large number of more specific alerts that 
are also helpful warnings.  To address this we have created a category called “Grey 
Positive” for an alert that could be perceived as either a false positive or a true positive 
depending on the context.  If an alert clearly is a false positive, such as an alert for a 
Trojan infection during an Nmap SYN scan, then we will categorize it as a false positive.  
However, if an alert is generated for an attempted scan of the VNC protocol while 
conducting the Nmap SYN scan, the alert is an indicator of a scan, and could therefore be 
considered a “grey positive.” 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our results.  Snort generated 10 false positives and 
Suricata 8; the difference was in the fragmented packets category where Snort had 2 false 
positives and Suricata had none.  This low number of false positives can be accounted for 
when looking at our “grey positive” category.  Snort had a total of 1168 grey positives 
and Suricata 1449.  The majority of these came from the category of evasion techniques 
because the tests consisted of five separate port scans, so the amount of traffic generated 
for this test alone was significantly more than any other test. 














Client Side Attacks 5 0 0 0 10 
Test Rules 0 4 61 11 7 
Bad Traffic 2 0 5 0 3 
Fragmented Packets 3 2 0 0 4 
Multiple Failed Logins 0 0 0 3 3 
Evasion Techniques 1 3 1640 13 20 
Shell Codes 4 1 9 16 13 
Denial of Service 0 0 5 1 1 
PCAP Replay 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 16 10 1168 44 62 
Table 1.   Summary of Snort Alerts 
 









Client Side Attacks 0 0 9 16 16 
Test Rules 0 4 68 12 12 
Bad Traffic 2 0 5 0 6 
Fragmented Packets 3 0 4 2 9 
Multiple Failed Logins 0 0 4 0 2 
Evasion Techniques 2 3 1275 12 29 
Shell Codes 4 1 4 38 25 
Denial of Service 0 0 5 1 2 
PCAP Replay 1 0 0 0 2 
Total 12 8 1449 81 103 
Table 2.   Summary of Suricata Alerts 
In calculating the recall and precision for our experiment, we calculated both a 
pure precision, consisting of only false and true positive, and a realistic precision, which 






Application Recall Precision 
Snort .73 .81 
Snort (grey and false +)  .036 
Suricata .87 .91 
Suricata (grey and false +)  .052 
Table 3.   Snort and Suricata Recall and Precision 
We now give an analysis of the detection success in each category of attack. 
• Client-Side Attacks – These tests simulated the actions of a user 
downloading an infected file from the Internet.  We conducted 5 Client 
Side Attack tests where we downloaded 4 infected PDF files and 1 
infected XLS file across our network and through the intrusion-detection 
system.  In all 5 cases Suricata generated true-positive alerts from the 
malicious downloads.  On the same rule set Snort did not generate any 
alerts.  There were a number of additional alerts that were false positives 
generated during the test including alerts for a file transfer (a necessary 
function of the Pytbull application to record the alert data), a tilde 
character in the URI, and a successful FTP login (a necessary function 
used by Pytbull to retrieve the alert data). 
• Test Rules  – This test evaluated how well the detection engine responded 
to a variety of different probes into a network.  Included are Local File 
Inclusion (LFI) attacks, various network scans, SQL injections, and 
reverse shell attempts.  For these tests Pytbull used HTTP requests, along 
with the Nmap, Netcat, and Nikto applications.  Both Suricata and Snort 
generated a number of true positive and false positive alerts for the test 
traffic.  In test number 9 Pytbull generates an Nmap full-connect scan 
across all 65535 ports.  While this was correctly identified and alerted by 
both Suricata and Snort as an Nmap scan, both detection engines also 
generated an alert for a potential VNC scan of ports 5800-5820, which is 
understandable since Nmap is scanning VNC ports too.  During the same 
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scan both Suricata and Snort generated a false positive alert for a possible 
network Trojan attack, which was in fact not occurring.  While these false 
positive alerts reflected a valid event (scanning of VNC ports), they could 
be a distraction from the larger overall picture that the entire network was 
being scanned. 
• Bad Traffic  – These tests consisted of malformed network packets in 
which either the flags in the TCP header were not set correctly or the type 
of packet did not match its header.  This test used Nmap and Scapy to 
generate malformed packets.  Both Suricata and Snort only alerted on 1 
out of the 3 malformed packet tests, and neither generated an alarm on the 
Scapy-modified packets.  The first packet was a common “Xmas scan” 
generated by Nmap; the second used Scapy to modify the IP protocol flag 
to indicate version 3; and the third changed the source and destination port 
to the same number. 
• Fragmented Packets  –  For these tests Pytbull implemented two types of 
fragmented packet attacks, a Ping-of-Death attack where the packet 
fragments when reassembled are larger than allowed in the protocol 
specification, and a Nestea attack where the order of reassembly is out of 
sequence.  Both Suricata and Snort were unable to detect the Nestea 
attack, and Snort generated a false-positive alert for an outbound SSH 
scan.  Suricata alone detected the Ping-of-Death attack. 
• Multiple Failed Logins  Using a known bad username and password 
combination, Pytbull attempted to log into the server multiple times.  
Suricata generated a false positive alert for each of these attempts as a 
regular login attempt but not as a failed attempt.  Snort generated an “FTP 
Bad Login” alert for each one. 
• Evasion Techniques  – These tests employed common techniques for 
evading detection engines.  The first two used the decoy function within 
Nmap to obscure the source address of the attacker by hiding it within a 
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number of other IP addresses.  We were unable to obtain accurate results 
from this test because our installation of Pytbull was on a virtual machine 
that performed network-address translation, so the attempts by Nmap to 
use different IP addresses resulted in the same IP address, defeating the 
evasion attempt.  The next test used hexadecimal encoding to attempt to 
evade the detection engines; neither Snort nor Suricata detected it.  Test 28 
used Nmap to generate small fragments for the TCP portion of the packets 
in an attempt to overwhelm the detection engine with reassembly tasks.  
Both detection engines were able to detect that a scan was occurring, 
however, Snort was the only one that identified the use of Nmap scripting 
and generated an appropriate alert.  In tests 29 through 38 Pytbull used the 
various evasion techniques within the Nikto web application scanner to 
attempt an evasion of the detection engine.  Both Suricata and Snort were 
effective in detecting the scans; however in only two of the tests (30 and 
36) could they identify the scan as Nikto-specific.  On all of the other tests 
both Suricata and Snort alerted on the web scanning activity but did not 
identify the scans as Nikto.  Finally, in test 39 Pytbull used JavaScript 
obfuscation to attempt evasion of the detection engines.  Snort alerted but 
Suricata did not. 
• Shell Codes –  Pytbull sent 13 different shellcode attacks through the 
detection engine.  Of the 13 attempts, Suricata detected 10 and Snort 
detected 9.  The three shell code attempts missed by Suricata were also 
missed by Snort, and were 1)” IRIX SGI + NOOP,” 2) Buffer Overflow 
Attempt, and 3) Cisco VTY creation, password creation, and privilege 
escalation.  In addition to these three, Snort also missed the “x86 setgid 0 
&& setuid 0.” 
• Denial of Service  – Denial-of-service attacks are difficult to test without 
causing a true denial of service.  Pytbull has two that it can perform.  One 
uses the utility hping to generate an ICMP ping flood to the target 
machine, and one is an attempt to attack a specific application (MSSQL in 
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this case) with a DoS attack.  We were unable to perform the hping DoS 
attack as that would have caused an actual denial of service on our 
network.  Both Suricata and Snort detected the MSSQL DoS attempt, 
however neither one identified it as a DoS-specific attack.  Instead, both 
alerted on suspicious traffic sent to the MSSQL TCP port 1433. 
• Pcap Replay – This is the replay of a previously captured malicious 
payload to test how well the intrusion-detection system engine can detect 
other malware.  For our test we used only one Pcap capture containing a 
sample of the Slammer worm.  In this test neither Snort nor Suricata 
detected the Slammer worm code. 
To summarize Experiment 3, when Suricata and Snort were loaded using the 
same rule set, in some cases both failed to generate alerts on known malicious traffic.  
When both failed, we can be fairly confident that this can be attributed to the rules and 
not the detection engines.  In a few cases there were discrepancies between the Snort and 
Suricata alerts.  One explanation could be differences in the implementation of the rule 
language between Snort and Suricata.  Presently Suricata version 1.1 beta 2 does not 
support the “file_data” rule keyword, and rules in the VRT rule set that use it cause an 
error when loaded.  Another explanation could be in the implementation of the detection 
algorithm within each application which could affect how the detection engine examines 
packets, but it is hard to obtain details of the implementations. 
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We evaluated two open-source network-based intrusion-detection systems for the 
NPS environment.  Snort is currently the de-facto standard for open-source network-
based intrusion-detection systems around the world (SourceFire, 2011).  Suricata is still 
in early stages of development but offers speed improvements and capabilities 
unavailable in Snort. 
Both Suricata and Snort are very capable intrusion-detection systems, each with 
strengths and weaknesses.  We tested Suricata and Snort on similar data to provide an 
informed recommendation to the Information Technology Department of the Naval 
Postgraduate School on whether to use Suricata as an additional layer of defense for the 
Educational Research Network.  Both Suricata and Snort performed well during tests.  
Both did have false positives and false negatives, but much of that can be attributed to 
weaknesses of the rule set used for the tests.  It was inconclusive from our tests whether 
Suricata or Snort has a better detection algorithm. 
Suricata’s multi-threaded architecture requires more memory and CPU resources 
than Snort.  We saw that the aggregate CPU use of Suricata was nearly double that of 
Snort, and Suricata used over double the amount of RAM used by Snort.  This could be 
attributed to the overhead required to manage the multiple detection threads in Suricata.  
Suricata has the advantage that it can grow to accommodate increased network traffic 
without requiring multiple instances.  Snort is lightweight and fast but limited in its 
ability to scale beyond 200-300 Mbps network bandwidth per instance.  While Snort’s 
processing overhead is less than that of Suricata, the need for multiple instances to 
accomplish what Suricata can achieve with its multi-threaded design elevates the cost to 
operate and manage a Snort environment. 
Experiment Two showed a big improvement in the performance of Suricata on 48 
CPUs, but only by increasing the configuration variable max-pending-packets while in 
the autofp run-mode. 
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Experiment Three reinforced the importance of a well-tuned rule set for a system.  
In our test, both detection engines missed several common malicious payloads that 
should have been detected.  Had the rules been properly tuned for the environment the 
false negative rate would have been less with a corresponding increase in true positive 
alerts. 
Operating an intrusion-detection system on a virtual host introduced additional 
complications.  In our experiments, we had problems with network throughput when 
monitoring the live network traffic from the 20Gbps network backbone.  Further 
investigation into the network hardware used with the ESXi server is required to diagnose 
the cause for the high number of dropped packets on Suricata, Snort and Tcpdump. 
However, operational deployment of intrusion detection in a virtual host is unnecessary at 
NPS so these issues may be moot. 
During our research the Suricata development team released three minor version 
changes (1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 1.0.5) and two beta versions (1.1 beta1 and 2) of the next minor 
version change.  Each version contained significant improvements to the previous 
version, illustrating the rapid advancement of the detection engine.  By comparison, Snort 
has been on the same production release (2.9.0.5) for 5 months.  Rapid development 
requiring frequent upgrades is not an optimal choice for a production environment 
intrusion detection, so that is a weakness of Suricata.  Nonetheless, the pace of upgrades 
is likely to slow and Suricata should be more reliable. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Suricata is a very capable intrusion-detection system and should be used to 
augment the existing Snort system at the Naval Postgraduate School.  The ability to use 
multi-threaded techniques in a multiple-CPU environment will give Suricata an 
advantage over single-threaded detection engines like Snort as the network throughput at 
NPS continues to increase. 
Snort is still very capable and should remain in use within the NPS production 
environment for the immediate future.   But as the actual bandwidth on the NPS ERN 
backbone continues to grow to rates greater than 200 Mbps, the single-threaded Snort 
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architecture will not be able to keep up with the network load (Lococo, 2011).  Deploying 
both Snort and Suricata today will mean an easier transition to the multi-thread design of 
Suricata as the network load begins to overwhelm the existing Snort infrastructure. 
Network intrusion-detection systems are just one security technology, and we 
must also incorporate host-based systems so that we can catch the percentage of threats 
that are missed by firewalls and other network-monitoring systems. A weakness of both 
is the reliance on signatures for detection.  While signatures will detect most of the 
known malicious traffic in an enterprise, they cannot detect something that has not been 
seen before.  For this we must additionally use anomaly-based intrusion-detection 
systems.  To support the distributed deployment of intrusion-detection systems Suricata 
should consider incorporating SNMP traps as an additional means to deliver alerts to the 
event management console. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a number of areas for future research involving intrusion detection.  As 
attempts to compromise our information become more and more complex, it will become 
more difficult to detect these new threats.  As we increase the number of sensors 
distributed throughout our networks, the task of managing and correlating the information 
produced by these sensors grows.  If we are to be effective at monitoring our networks 
and guarding the information that resides therein, we must make a concerted effort to 
become aware of everything on the network.  Alert and event correlation is a step in that 
direction, and improving how we monitor and interpret that information is worthy of 
future research. 
Within the intrusion-detection category specifically, additional research should be 
performed in the incorporation of signature and anomaly-based intrusion detection to 
meet the unknown and persistent threats to our information and data infrastructure.  
Presently the two technologies are usually separate and require independent 
implementations.  Future research should address the integration of both signature and 
anomaly-based intrusion detection into a unified and seamless solution. 
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APPENDIX A 
ANNEX 1 TABLE OF COMBINED SURICATA AND SNORT ALERTS 
DURING TESTING 
The following table is a summary of the alerts generated during the variation of 
experiment 1: the combined run of Suricata and Snort while observing the same ERN 
network traffic.  The SID is the Snort ID number of the rule associated with the 
description in the next column.  The Difference column is the difference between the 
number of alerts generated by Suricata and Snort, and is represented as a percentage in 
the last column.  This data was collected over a 4 hour period where both detection 







382  ICMP PING Windows 805 791 14 2%
384  ICMP PING 13112 11986 1126 9%
408  ICMP Echo Reply 13115 11989 1126 9%
449  ICMP Time-To-Live Exceeded in Transit 13122 11996 1126 9%
527  GPL SCAN same SRC/DST 12940
2189  GPL MISC IP Proto 103 PIM 16481 16229 252 2%
2000328  ET POLICY Outbound Multiple Non-SMTP Server Emails 16842 16535 307 2%
2001328  ET POLICY SSN Detected in Clear Text (dashed) 16844 16536 308 2%
2001375  ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (16 digit spaced) 36100 23396 12704 35%
2001376  ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (16 digit dashed) 36101
2001377  ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (16 digit) 36400 23571 12829 35%
2001378  ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit) 36411 23578 12833 35%
2001379  ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (15 digit spaced) 36414
2001381  ET POLICY Credit Card Number Detected in Clear (14 digit) 36414 23579 12835 35%
2001384  ET POLICY SSN Detected in Clear Text (spaced) 36429 23581 12848 35%
2001402  ET POLICY ZIPPED DOC in transit 41323 27116 14207 34%
2001403  ET POLICY ZIPPED XLS in transit 45286 29724 15562 34%
2001404  ET POLICY ZIPPED EXE in transit 45369 29800 15569 34%
2001405  ET POLICY ZIPPED PPT in transit 48915 32161 16754 34%
2001978  ET POLICY SSH session in progress on Expected Port 49645 32805 16840 34%
2001980  ET POLICY SSH Client Banner Detected on Unusual Port 49646
2002658  ET POLICY EIN in the clear (US-IRS Employer ID Number) 49655 32813 16842 34%
2002752  ET POLICY Reserved Internal  IP Traffic 49656 32814 16842 34%
2003195  ET POLICY Unusual  number of DNS No Such Name Responses 49726 32879 16847 34%
2003292  ET WORM Allaple ICMP Sweep Ping Outbound 49731
2003864  ET POLICY Outbound SMTP on port 587 49733 32881 16852 34%
2008581  ET P2P BitTorrent DHT ping request 49734 32882 16852 34%
2009702  ET POLICY DNS Update From External  net 49981 33120 16861 34%
2011368  ET SCAN TCP Traffic (ET SCAN Malformed Packet SYN RST) 50030 33164 16866 34%
2011540  ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA - Internet Widgits Pty (O) 50031 33166 16865 34%
2100382  GPL ICMP_INFO PING Windows 50836 33957 16879 33%
2100384  GPL ICMP_INFO PING 63141 45942 17199 27%
2100408  GPL ICMP_INFO Echo Reply 63144 45944 17200 27%
2100449  GPL MISC Time-To-Live Exceeded in Transit 63151 45950 17201 27%
2100466  GPL ICMP L3retriever Ping 63261 46060 17201 27%
2100480  GPL ICMP_INFO PING speedera 74651 57143 17508 23%
2100485  GPL ICMP_INFO Destination Unreachable Communication Administratively Prohibited 119536 100348 19188 16%
2100486  GPL ICMP_INFO Destination Unreachable Communication with Destination Host is Administratively Prohibited 120045 100832 19213 16%
2100487  GPL ICMP_INFO Destination Unreachable Communication with Destination Network is Administratively Prohibited 120045 100832 19213 16%
2101620  GPL POLICY TRAFFIC Non-Standard IP protocol 101343
100000158  GPL VOIP SIP INVITE message flooding 101344
Comparison of Snort and Suricata Alerts  07/27
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ANNEX 2 EXAMPLE PYTBULL REPORTS FOR SURICATA AND 
 SNORT 
Category: Client Side Attacks 
Test 4: Corrupt PDF File (CVE2009-4324) 
Snort False Negative:  Both alerts generated by Snort in this example are due to 
the Pytbull process of obtaining the alert data from the intrusion-detection system.  
Neither alert relates to the exploited PDF file that was transmitted in Test 4. 
 
Suricata True Positive:  Suricata generated an alarm based on the PDF file 
containing JavaScript. 
 
Category: Test Rules 
Test #6: Simple LFI Attack 
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Snort True Positive:  Snort generated an alert based on the ‘/etc/passwd’ string 
passed through an HTTP command.   
 
Suricata True Positive: Suricata generated an alert based on the ‘/etc/passwd’ 
string passed through an HTTP command.   
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APPENDIX B 
ANNEX 1 EMERGING THREATS (ET) AND VULNERABILITY RESEARCH 
TEAM (VRT) RULE CATEGORIES USED IN EXPERIMENTS. 
 
 - emerging-all.rules  - policy.rules 
 - attack-responses.rules  - pop2.rules 
 - backdoor.rules  - pop3.rules 
 - bad-traffic.rules  - rpc.rules 
 - blacklist.rules  - rservices.rules 
 - botnet-cnc.rules  - scada.rules 
 - chat.rules  - scan.rules 
 - content-replace.rules  - shellcode.rules 
 - ddos.rules  - smtp.rules 
 - dns.rules  - snmp.rules 
 - dos.rules  - specific-threats.rules 
 - exploit.rules  - spyware-put.rules 
 - finger.rules  - sql.rules 
 - ftp.rules  - telnet.rules 
 - icmp-info.rules  - tftp.rules 
 - icmp.rules  - virus.rules 
 - imap.rules  - voip.rules 
 - info.rules  - web-activex.rules 
 - misc.rules  - web-attacks.rules 
 - multimedia.rules  - web-cgi.rules 
 - mysql.rules  - web-client.rules 
 - netbios.rules  - web-coldfusion.rules 
 - nntp.rules  - web-frontpage.rules 
 - oracle.rules  - web-iis.rules 
 - other-ids.rules  - web-misc.rules 
 - p2p.rules  - web-php.rules 
 - phishing-spam.rules  - x11.rules 
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